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PROPERTY INTERESTS-HUSBAND AND WIFE
EQUALITY OF PROPERTY INTERESTS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE
By M. R. KIRKWOOD*
T nis article is written in response to a suggestion that lawyers
in "common law" jurisdictions might be interested in a brief
comparison of the property interests of husband and wife under
the common law as modified by modem statutes and under the
community property system as it prevails in a number of states in
this country. Such a discussion may be timely in view of the
fact that there is now much agitation for complete equality of
property interests as between husband and wife and in view
of the further fact that in a number of states this agitation has
led to the suggestion that the community property system be
more generally adopted because of a supposed greater degree of
equality therein. It is, of course, impossible to make any ex-
haustive study of either system within the limits of a single
article. We shall content ourselves, therefore, with a com-
parison of a few of the salient elements of ownership as they'
exist under the two systems, and it will be necessary throughout
to speak in very general terms.
I
It is common knowledge that the whole trend of legislation in
modern times, in so far as it relates to the property of married
women, has been toward an extension and strengthening of her
rights and powers resulting in a corresponding limitation of the
rights and powers of the husband with respect to her property.
Such legislation has not been uniform in the various states, in-
deed there have been great differences particularly in matters
of detail. Further, there has been much difference in the points
of view of courts in the interpretation of such legislation. Some
courts have proceeded upon the principle that these statutes be-
ing in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed
and not extended beyond "what is expressed by their words, or
necessarily implied from what is expressed."'- In other states
courts have looked upon such statutes as remedial in character
*Dean of the Law School, Stanford University.
'Thompson v. Weller, (1877) 85 I1. 197. Cf. also Junction Railroad
Co. v. Harris, (1857) 9 Ind. 184, 68 Am. Dec. 618; Brookings v. White,
(1862) 49 Me. 479; Fretz v. Roth, (1904) 68 N. J. Eq. 528, 59 Atl. 676;
Bertles v. Nunan, (1883) 92 N. Y. 152, 44 Am. Rep. 361.
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and so to be construed liberally. 2 For present purposes we shall
concern ourselves with the law in those jurisdictions where the
legislation and the interpretation thereof by the courts have
been most liberal. The law in such states expressing as it does
an advanced view of equality of property interest may be taken
as indicative of what can reasonably be expected elsewhere by.
statutory modification of the common law. For purposes of
convenience we shall refer to such states as "modified common
law jurisdictions" and the law as so altered by statute as the
"modified common law system" as distinguished from the "com-
munity property system."
The so-called Married Women's Property Acts recognize the
right of the wife to hold property separate and apart from her
husband. In general the definition of her separate estate is the
same as that of the husband's. Thus all property, real or per-
sonal, owned by her at the time of marriage is usually included
therein.3 Gifts inter vivos, 4 bequests5 and property acquired by
descent6  during marriage; property acquired with separate
funds ;7 the rents, issues, profits8 and proceeds 9 of separate prop-
erty; earnings,10 profits made in the conduct of separate busi-
2Bucci v. Poppovich, (1921) 93 N. J. Eq. 121, 115 Atl. 95; Kriz
v. Peege, (1903) 119 Wis. 105, 95 N. W. 108; Farmers' Bank v. Hageluken,
(1901) 165 Mo. 443, 65 S. W. 728; Riggs v. Price, (1919) 277 Mo. 333,
210 S. W. 420; Spencer'v. St. Paul Railroad Co., (1875) 22 Minn. 29.
3Ilgenfritz v. Ilgenfritz, (1892) 49 Mo. App. 127.
4Lyon v. Lyon, (1903) 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2100, 72 S. W. 1102; Ilgen-
fritz v. Ilgenfritz, (1892) 49 Mo. App. 127; Holthaus v. Hornbostle, (1875)
60 Mo. 439 (equitable separate estate).
5Buck v. Ashbrook, (1875) 59 Mo. 200; See v. Zabriskie, (1877) 28
N. J. Eq. 422; Smith v. Whitfield, (1881) 71 Ala. 106; Smith v. Hardy,
(1874) 36 Wis. 417.
6Robinson v. Payne, (1881) 58 Miss. 690.
7Smith v. Whitfield, (1881) 71 Ala. 106; Seay v. Hesse, (1894) 123
Mo. 450, 24 S. W. 1017; Cheuvete v. Mason, (1854) 4 Greene (Ia.) 231;
Crump v. Walkup, (1912) 246 Mo. 266. 151 S. W. 709; Smith v. Hardy,
(1874) 36 Wis. 417. In some states property purchased on her personal
credit is deemed separate. Rankin v. West, (1872) 25 Mich. 195; Hoover
v. Carver, (1916) 135 Minn. 105, 160 N. W. 249; Dayton v. Walsh, (1879)
47 Wis. 113, 2 N. W. 65, 32 Am. Rep. 757.
sChorn v. Chorn's Administrators, (1896) 98 Ky. 627, 17 Ky. L.
Rep. 1178, 33 S. W. 1107 (separate estate in equity) ; Dayton v. Walsh,
(1879) 47 Wis. 113, 2 N. W. 65, 32 Am. Rep. 757 (immaterial that such
are due to the efforts of the husband in working the wife's farm); Als-
durf v. Williams, (1902) 196 Ill. 244, 63 N. E. 686; Olson v. O'Connor-
(1900) 9 N. Dak. 504, 84 N. W. 359, 81 A. S. R. 595.
9Hollenbeck v. Peck, (1895) 96 Ia. 210, 64 N. W. 780, and compare
cases cited in note 7.
lOArnold v. Buchanan, (1916) 60 Ind. App. 626, 111 N. E. 204; Savage
v. Modern Woodmen of America, (1911) 84 Kans. 63, 113 Pac. 802; Booth
v. Backus, (1918) 182 Ia. 1319, 166 N. W. 695.
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ness;11 choses in action for personal injuries' 2 -are all commonly
made a part of her separate estate.
She is given the general power of control and the right to
possession of such separate property,13 and, conversely the hus-
band is denied most of his ancient common law rights therein.
Thus it is held that he cannot sell or mortgage the wife's sep-
arate chattels1 4 or real property1 5 even to the extent of leasing
the latter ;6 her separate property is not liable for the separate
debts of the husband.17 In short the husband is a stranger to
the title of such property" and can deal with it only in accord-
ance with the usual rules of agency.'9 On the other hand the
wife is given broad powers of management and alienation of
her separate property. She may mortgage and convey both her
chattels and her real property.20 While in some states the con-
sent of the husband to the alienation of her real property is still
"'Hoover v. Carver, (1916) 135 Minn. 105, 160 N. W. 249; Hibbard v.
Heckart, (1901) 88 Mo. App. 544,; Abbey v. Deyo, (1871) 44 N. Y. 343.
In the last two cases cited it is held to be immaterial that the wife em-
ployed her husband to conduct the business and that the earnings were
largely due to his efforts.
'
2 Arnold v. Buchanan, (1916) 60 Ind. App. 626, 111 N. E. 204; Libaire
v. Minneapolis R. Co., (1911) 113 Minn. 517, 130 N. W. 8; Berger v. Jacobs,(1870) 21 Mich. 215; Fife v. Oshkosh, (1895) 89 Wis. 540, 62 N. W. 541;
City of Wyandotte v. Agan, (1887) 37 Kan. 528, 15 Pac. 529.
"3Quilty v. Battie, (1892) 135 N. Y. 201, 32 N. E. 47, 17 L. R. A. 521,
and see cases in notes following.
14Koch v. Salee, (1912) 176 Ill. App. 379; Caylor Lumber Co. v. Mays,
(Okla. 1918) 174 Pac. 521; Klein v. Frerichs, (1914) 127 Minn. 177, 149
N. W. 2; Knight v. Beckwith Commercial Co., (1896) 6 Wyo. 500, 46
Pac. 1094.
15 Prater v. Hoover, (1860) 41 Tenn. 544; Union Stave Co. v. Smith,
(1896) 116 Ala. 416, 22 So. 275, 67 A. S. R. 140; Baker v. Brundage, (1915)
131 Minn. 299, 154 N. W. 1086.
'6Jenney v. Gray, (1855) 5 Oh. St. 45; Van Brunt v. Wallace, (1902)
88 Minn. 116, 92 N. W. 521; Carman v. Fox, (1914) 86 Misc. 197, 149
N. Y. S. 213.
'17 Alsdurf v. Williams, (1902) 196 Ill. 244, 63 N. W. 686; Hoover v.
Carver, (1916) 135 Minn. 105, 160 N. W. 249; Hudson v. Wright, (1907)
204 Mo. 412, 103 S. W. 8; Gage v. Dauchy, (1866) 34 N. Y. 293; Cheuvete
v. Mason, (1854) 4 Greene (Ia.) 231; Rankin v. West, (1872) 25 Mich.
195; Farmers' State Bank v. Keen, (1917) 66 Okla. 62, 167 Pac. 207.
'ISMygatt v. Coe, (1897) 152 N. Y. 457, 46 N. E. 949, 57 A. S. R.'521
(covenant for title by husband joining in a deed of wife's separate property
is the covenant of a stranger and will not run to later grantees); Agri-
cultural Co. v. Montague, (1878) 38 Mich. 548 (husband has no insurable
interest in wife's separate property).
19 McLaren v. Hall, (1868) 26 Iowa 297; Hoffman v. McFadden, (1892)
56 Ark. 217, 19 S. W. 753, 35 A. S. R. 101.
2 0Edwards v. Schoeneman, (1882) 104 Ill. 278; Low v. Anderson,
(1875) 41 Ia. 476; Morrison v. Morrison, (1902) 113 Ky. 507, 69 S. W.
1102, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 786; Hackley Bank v. Jeannot, (1906) 143 Mich. 454,
106 N. W. 1121.
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required2' there are a number of jurisdictions where even this
requirement has been abandoned. 22 In many jurisdictions a
married woman has been given full testamentary control over
her separate property.23
The common law interests of curtesy and dower have also
been materially modified. Thus the husband's right to curtesy
initiate has been limited and in many cases wholly abolished. 24
Dower and curtesy still exist in many states but in almost all
such jurisdictions modern legislation has tended toward an equal-
ization of the two interests. 25 In many others both dower and
curtesy have been abolished and other interests have been sub-
stituted for them, usually by way of succession. The very
definite tendency of such legislation has been toward equality of
interest between the spouses. 26
From the above summary it appears that substantial equality
of property interest has been secured in many jurisdictions by
statutory modification of the common law. Husband and wife
have in the most liberal states practically equal interests in the
property of each other and practically equal legal powers in
the acquisition, enjoyment, management, control and disposition
of separate property. It is argued, however, that this apparent
equality is false in at least one respect, viz., that it fails to
21Johnson v. Jouchert, (1890) 124 Ind. 105, 24 N. E. 580; Starkey v.
Starkey,' (1906) 166 Ind. 140, 76 N. E. 876; White Co. v. Moore, (1921)
190 Ky. 671, 288 S. W. 679.
22OWings v. Wiggins, (1896) 133 Mo. 630, 34 S. W. 877 (mortgage);
Farmers' Bank v. Hageluken, (1901) 165 Mo. 443, 65 S. W. 728 (deed of
trust); Merritt v. Park Bank, (1920) 77 Okla. 148, 187 Pac. 232 (mort-
gage); Wallace-v. St. John, (1903) 119 Wis. 585, 97 N. W. 197; Jordan
v. Jackson, (1906) 76 Neb. 15, 106 N. W. 999; Lawler v. Byrne, (1911) 252
Ill. 194, 96 N. E. 892.
23Kelly v. Aired, (1888) 65 Miss. 495, 4 So. 551 ; Hamilton v. Rathbone,
(1899) 175 U. S. 414, 44 L. Ed. 219, 20 S. C. R. 155, (dealing with the law
of the District of Columbia) ; Schull v. Murray, (1869) 32 Md. 9; Allen
v. Little, (1831) 5 Oh. St. 66; Grubb's Estate, (1896) 174 Pa. St.' 187,
34 Atl. 573; see statutes collected in 1 Woerner, American Law of Admin-
istration, 3rd Ed., 32.
24Loyd v. Planters Mutual Insurance Association, (1906) 80 Ark. 486.
97 S. W. 658; Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, (1912) 246 Mo. 711, 152 S. W.
38; Mathews v. Glockel, (1908) 82 Neb. 207, 117 N. W. 404; Albany Bank
v. McCarty, (1896) 149 N. Y. 71, 43 N. E. 427.25Compare, Heisen v. Heisen, (1893) 145 Ill. 658, 34 N. E. 597 (curtesy
as such is abolished but the husband is given an interest in the wife's
property equal to her interest in his, both of such interests being called-
"dower") ; Downey v. King, (1909) 201 Mass. 59, 87 N. E. 468; see the
statutes collected in 1 Woerner, the American Law of Administration, 3rd
Ed. 331, 411.
261 Burns, Annotated Statutes of Indiana, 1908, sec. 3013, 3014, 3016;
Kansas, General Statutes, 1909, sec. 2961; Connecticut, Statutes, 1918,
sec. 5055; Minnesota, General Statutes, 1913, sec. 7238; Nebraska Statutes,
1922, sec. 1220, 1223; see also 1 Woerner, op. cit. 334, 412, 192, 195.
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recognize the contribution made to the family life by the services
of the wife in the performance of her domestic duties as equal
to the services of the husband in the accumulation of wealth. It
is largely because of a supposed recognition of such equality in
the community system that the adoption of the latter is urged.
Let us then turn our attention to a brief consideration of the
salient features of this latter scheme of marital interests.
II
The community property system is derived from the civil
law and exists only in those states where there was a predominance
of settlers familiar with Spanish or French law and in a few
other states that have copied this legislation from the former.
The system prevails in the eight states of Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas and Washington.
It is generally held that the rights of husband and wife are to
be determined solely by construction of the statutes and this
is usually done without reference to the system as it actually
existed in Spanish or French law. It will serve no useful pur-
pose at present .therefore to delve into the ancient history of the
system. Where in force, the community system displaces en-
tirely the common law system of marital property interests. Thus
there is no recognition of dower,2 7 curtesy 27 or tenancy by the
entirety.2 8 On the other hand, all non-marital common law forms
of ownership are possible. For example, husband and wife may
hold property as tenants in common or as joint tenants. 29
27See, for example, California, Civil Code, sec. 173; Idaho, Compiled
Statutes 1919, sec. 4668; Nevada, Revised Laws 1912, sec. 2161; New
Mexico, Statutes 1915, secs. 2763, 2757; Washington, Remington's Statutes
1919, secs. 6897, 1343.
2sSwan v. Walden, (1909) 156 Cal. 195, 103 Pac. 931. This form of
ownership has been materially altered in the modified common law jurisdic-
tions also. While a majority of such jurisdictions continue to recognize
the existence of the tenancy, Way v. Root, (1913) 174 Mich. 418, 140
N. W. 577; Matter of Klatzl, (1915) 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181; Davis
v. Clark, (1866) 26 Ind. 424, 89 Am. Dec. 471; Chase v. McKenzie, (1916)
81 Ore. 429, 159 Pac. 1025, others hold that the married women's property
acts have abolished it, Wilson v. Wilson, (1890) 43 Minn. 398, 45 N. W.
710; Wallace v. St. John, (1903) 119 Wis. 585, 97 N. W. 197; Lawler v.
Byrne, (1911) 252 Ill. 194, 96 N. E. 892, or that it is "repugnant to our
institutions . . . and therefore not the common law of this state."
Kerner v. McDonald, (1900) 60 Neb. 663, 84 N. W. 92. In states still
recognizing the existence of such tenancy the married women's property
acts are frequently held to modify many of its common law incidents, for
example, the power of the husband to convey an estate -for his own life,
Hiles v. Fisher, (1895) 144 N. Y. 306, 39 N. E. 337, his right to appropriate
the rents and profits, Rezabek v. Rezabek, (1917) 196 Mo. App. 673, 192
S. W. 107, liability of the property for the debts of the husband, Shinn
v. Shinn, (1889) 42 Kansas 1, 21 Pac. 813; Davis v. Clark, (1866) 26
Ind. 424.
29See, for example, Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 161.
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Community property is usually defined in terms of separate
property. In California the separate property of the wife is
defined as follows:
"All property of the wife, owned by her before marriage, and
that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, with
the rents, issues and profits thereof, is her separate property."30
The separate property of the husband is defined in the same
way.31 Community property is defined:
"All other property acquired after marriage by either husband
or wife, or both, . . . is community property.. -
Subject to some variations, with which we need not now
concern ourselves, similar definitions will be found in other states
adopting this system. 33
There are some differences in the statutes as to the content
of the separate property of each spouse and there are further
differences in matters of detail in the judicial decisions of the
different states. In a general article of this kind it is impracticable
to note all of these differences. For present purposes the content
of the separate estate of each spouse as set forth above will be
sufficiently accurate.
A few words as to the legal meaning of "separate property."
The supreme court of California in an early case thought that
such term meant the same in the community system as in the
modified common law system. The California constitution of
1849 provided that:
"All property, both real and personal, of the wife owned
or claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired afterward
by gift, devise or descent, shall be her separate property."
The legislature declared that the rents and profits of the
separate estate of either husband or wife should be community
property, which latter was placed under the exclusive manage-
ment and control of the husband. In holding this part of the
3OCal. Civil Code, sec. 162.3
'Cal. Civil Code, sec. 163.32Cal. Civil Code, sec. 164.33Arizona, Civil Code, secs. 3848, 3850; Idaho, Statutes of 1919, secs.
4656, 4659 (but the rents, issues and profits of separate property belong to
the community unless, in case of the wife, the instrument conveying the
property to her provides that such rents, etc., are to be held for her sole
and separate use, "in which case the management and disposal of such
rents and profits belong to the wife, and they are not liable for the debts
of the husband." Ibid. secs. 4656, 4660) ; Louisiana, Marr's Ann. Rev. St.
1915, secs. 4449, 4450, 4451; New Mexico, Statutes 1915, sees. 2757, 2758,
2764; Nevada, Statutes of 1912, secs. 2155, 2160; Texas, Vernon's Sayles'
Civil Statutes 1914, Art. 4621; Washington, Remington's Compiled Statutes
1922, secs. 6890, 6891, 6892, 6896.
PROPERTY INTERESTS-HUSBAND AND WIFE
statute unconstitutional as regards the rents, issues and profits of
the wife's separate estate the court said:
"This term 'separate property' has a fixed meaning in the
common law, and had in the minds of those who framed the
constitution, the large majority of whom were familiar with, and
had lived under that system. By the common law, the idea at-
tached to separate property in the wife, and which forms a por-
tion of its definition, is, that it is an estate, held as well in its
use as in its title, for the exclusive benefit and advantage of the
wife." 34
Under the earlier legislation in several community property
states the term "separate property" can hardly be said to have
been given such a broad meaning. Thus (there being no constitu-
tional obstacles) the rents, issues and profits of the separate
property of both husband and wife were frequently made a
part of the community property.35 The husband was often given
powers of management and control over the wife's separate prop-
erty, such powers ranging from a mere necessity for his joinder
in conveyances of her land and certain of her personal property 6
up to a practically complete power of management and control
in him. The tendency of recent legislation has been toward the
abolition of such interference by the husband and as a general
rule the wife now has entire control of her separate property.
This is expressed in sweeping terms in the statutes of some
states,37 while in others it is to be gathered from enactments re-
lating to specific powers. Thus she is usually given express
power to convey her separate property;"5 she is ordinarily not
liable for the debts of the husband,39 but is liable for her own
34George v. Ransom, (1860) 15 Cal. 322, 76 Am. Dec. 490.35This is still true in Idaho, and in Texas the interest on her bonds
and notes and dividends on her stock are part of the community property.
Presumably the same is true of other income from her separate personal
property. See statutes cited in note 33, supra.
36This is still required in Texas. Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes 1914,
sec. 4621.
37See, for example, Arizona, Civil Code, sec. 3851. ("Married women
shall have the sole and exclusive control of their separate property, and
the same shall not be liable for the debts, obligations or engagements of
the husband, and may be contracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged, con-
veyed, devised, or bequeathed by them in the same manner and with like
effect as if they were unmarried.") Idaho, Compiled Statutes 1919, sec.
4657; Washington, Remington's Compiled Statutes 1922, sec. 6890.
38California, Civil Code, sec. 162; Nevada, Revised Laws 1912, sec.
2163; New Mexico, Statutes 1915, sec. 2757; Texas, Vernon's Sayles'
Civil Statutes 1914, sec. 4621 (subject to qualification pointed out in note
36). See also statutes cited in note 37.
39Arizona, Civil Code, secs. 3851, 3853; Idaho, Compiled Statutes 1919,
sec. 4665; Nevada, Revised Laws 1912, sec. 2167, 2171; New Mexico,
Statutes 1915, sec. 2762; Texas, Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes 1914, sec.
4621; Washington, Remington's Compiled Statutes 1922, sec. 6890.
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debts.40 In the matter of disposition of her separate property at
death she is placed upon the same footing as is her husband in
regard to his property. As previously pointed out, dower and
curtesy are abolished. The wife has full power to pass her
separate property by will 41 and in case she dies intestate her
property goes to her husband and her descendants in the same
manner in which under similar dircumstances the husband's sep-
arate property goes to his window and his descendants.4 2 It seems
clear, therefore, that today her separate property is such in
the fullest meaning of the term. It is needless to add that the
husband's ownership of his separate estate is equally full.
In considering the nature of community property we shall
first note the respective rights and powers of husband and wife
in its management, control and disposition and then discuss the
legal theory of ownership of such property. Recognizing the
impracticability of joint control, the legislatures of all com-
munity property states have placed the management of such prop-
erty largely in the hands of the husband. As to both real and
personal property he usually has approximately the same powers
of management and control as he has of his separate property. 43
Conversely, the wife has no powers of management and con-
trol.44 As to liability of the community property for debts there
is some difference of opinion. Subject to a few exceptions it
is not liable for debts incurred by the wife. In most states it
is liable for both community and separate debts incurred by the
husband. Again the husband's separate property is usually
4OSee statutes cited in note 38.41Arizona, Civil Code, sec. 3851; California, Civil Code, sec. 1273;
Idaho, Compiled Statutes 1919, sec. 7809; Nevada, Revised Laws, 1912, sec.
6203; Texas, Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes 1914, secs. 7855, 7856; Wash-
ington, Remington's Compiled Statutes 1922, sec. 6891.42Arizona, Civil Code, sec. 1092; California, Civil Code, secs. 1386,
1400; Idaho, Compiled Statutes 1919, secs. 7793, 7802; Nevada, Revised
Laws 1912, secs. 6116, 6125; New Mexico Statutes 1915, secs. 1842, 5894;
Texas, Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes 1914, sec. 2461; Washington, Rem-
ington's Compiled Statutes 1922, secs. 1341, 1364.43California, Civil Code, secs. 172, 172a; Idaho, Compiled Statutes 1919,
secs. 4666, 4667; Louisiana, Revised Civil Code, sec. 2404; Nevada, Revised
Laws 1919, sec. 2160; New Mexico, Laws of 1915, ch. 84; Washington,
Remington's Compiled Statutes 1922, secs. 6892, 6893.44There are a few exceptions to this, for example, in New Mexico
if the husband is incapacitated by insanity, drunkenness, etc., the wife may
petition the proper court to appoint her to manage the community property,
Statutes 1915, sec. 2767. In Idaho where the rents and profits of separate
property belong to the community, the wife is given power to manage
such rents and profits of her separate property and she is given similar
power over her earnings. Idaho, Compiled Statutes 1919, sec. 4667. Com-
pare also a similar rule as to her earnings in Nevada. Nevada, Revised
Laws 1919, sec. 2160. See, too. in Texas, Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes
1914, sec. 4622.
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liable for community debts incurred by him but he cannot so
charge the wife's separate property.45
The wife- has no power, other than testamentary, to dispose
of the community property by her sole act.46 Conversely, the
husband usually does have such power so far as the community
personal property is concerned. 47 In some states the husband
apparently has equally broad powers of disposal over the com-
munity real property.48 The usual rule, however, is that he can-
not convey or mortgage real property, with minor exceptions,
unless the wife joins in the instrument.49
In a majority of states at the present time the husband and
the wife each have power to devise one half of the community
property, the other half enuring to the benefit of the survivor."c
In case the deceased dies intestate his or her share goes to de-
scendants, if there be such, in some states 5' while in others the
45For a detailed discussion of this matter and a collection of the
statutes and decisions dealing therewith, see an article by Prof. A. E.
Evans entitled Community Obligations in 10 Cal. L. Rev. 120.
46Except as to that part which is under her control. See note 44.
47Arizona, Civil Code, sec. 3850; California, Civil Code, sec. 172 (but
it is also provided in this state that "he cannot make a gift of such
property, or dispose of the same without a valuable consideration or sell,
convey or encumber the furniture, furnishings or fittings of the home, or
the clothing or wearing apparel of the wife or minor children that is
community, without the written consent of the wife") ; Idaho, Compiled
Statutes 1919, sec. 4666 (except as to wife's earnings and rents and profits
of her separate property); Louisiana, Revised Civil Code, sec. 2404 (but
he cannot dispose of the whole of such property without the wife's con-
sent) ; Nevada, Revised Laws 1919, sec. 2160; New Mexico, Laws 1915,
ch. 84; Texas, Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes 1914, sec. 4622 (except
that he cannot dispose of wife's earnings, interest on bonds and notes and
dividends on stock belonging to wife's separate property) ; Washington,
Remington's Compiled Statutes 1922, sec. 6892. But compare note 46.
48Compare First National Bank of Ely v. Meyers, (1916) 39 Nev. 235,
150 Pac. 308; Paschall v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 133 S. W. 509.
49Arizona, Civil Code, secs. 3850, 2061; California, Civil Code, sec. 172a;
Idaho, Compiled Statutes 1919, sec. 4666; New Mexico, Laws. 1915, ch. 84;
Washington, Remington's Compiled Statutes 1922, sec. 6893.
5OArizona, Civil Code, sec. 1100; California Civil Code, sec. 1401;
Idaho, Compiled Statutes 1919, sec. 7803 (but it can only be devised to "his,
her or their children or to a parent of either spouse," and in the latter case
only one-half of deceased's one-half may be devised) ; Louisiana, Revised
Civil Code, sec. 915; Washington, Remington's Compiled Statutes 1922, sec.
1342. In Nevada (Revised Laws 1912, secs. 2164, 2165) and New Mexico
(Statutes 1915, secs. 1840, 1841) the husband may devise one-half but the
wife ordinarily has no power of devise. In Texas neither can devise (cf.
Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes 1914, sec. 2469).51Arizona, Civil Code, sec. 1100; Louisiana, Revised Civil Code, sec.
915; Nevada, Revised Laws 1912, secs. 2164, 2165 (this is the rule on the
death of the husband. If the wife dies first the husband takes the entire
community property) ; New Mexico, Statutes 1915, sec. 1840 (rule similar
to Nevada except that on the husband's death, one-quarter of his share goes
to the wife and balance to his children) ; Texas, Vernon's Sayles' Civil
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entire community property under such circumstances belongs to
the survivor.
5-
2
Coming now to the legal nature of the respective interests
of husband and wife in the community property, we must note
some marked differences of decision in the various community
property states. Here again it will not be our purpose to con-
sider this problem in great detail but simply to outline the differ-
ing views for the purpose of comparing the relative positions
of husband and wife under the two systems. 3
In California there was some conflict in the language (usually
dicta) of the earlier cases as to the nature of the wife's interest
in the community property. Thus in one case5 4 the court speaks
of husband and wife as being "jointly seised of the property" and
says that the wife's interest "is a present, definite and certain"
one. And again,
"It belongs to the matrimonial community, not less to the wife
than to the husband . . . her mere right in the community
property is as well defined and ascertained in contemplation of
law, even during the marriage, as is that of the husband."' 5
However in the leading case of Packard v. Arellanes56 the doc-
trine which has come to be accepted in California was thus
stated:
"The title to such property rests in the husband, and for all
practical purposes he is regarded by law as the sole owner. It
is triie, the wife is a member of the community, and entitled to
an equal share of the acquests and gains; but so long as the
community exists her interest is a mere expectancy, and possesses
none of the attributes of an estate, either at law or in equity."
In view of the acceptance of this theory that the husband is
the owner of the community property the following results,
among others, have naturally been held to follow. Upon the
death of the husband, the wife surviving, the community prop-
erty is to be administered in its entirety as a part of his estate
and the widow takes her share by succession.5 7 Consequently,
she must pay an inheritance tax thereon under a statute taxing
Statutes 1914, sec. 2469; Washington, Remington's Compiled Statutes 1922,
sec. 1342. In most of these states the survivor takes all if the deceased
spouse leaves no descendants.
5-California, Civil Code, sec. 1401; Idaho, Compiled Statutes 1919,
sec. 7803.
53A detailed discussion of The Ownership of Community Property by
Prof. Evans will be found in 35 Harv. L. Rev. 47.
54Beard v. Knox, (1855) 5 Cal. 252, 63 Am. Dec. 125.55De Godey v. Godey, (1870) 39 Cal. 157. See also Harrison's
opinion in In re Burdick, (1896) 112 Cal. 387, 397, 44 Pac. 734.
56(1861) 17 Cal. 525.57 1n re Burdick, (1896) 112 Cal. 387, 44 Pac. 734.
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"all property passing by will or by the intestate laws."58 Upon
the death of the wife, the husband surviving, no part of the com-
munity property is to be administered as a part of her estate 5
and the husband does not take by succession." A defendant
who carries away community property in the form of jewelry
is guilty of larceny of the husband's property though it has been
delivered to the defendant by the wife whom he has seduced."
Under a statute providing that "Parties . . . to an action
or persons on whose behalf an action is prosecuted
against an executor as to any claim arising before the death of
the deceased" are not competent witnesses, a wife who cared for
the deceased in illness may testify in an action by her husband
to recover for the value of her services, her earnings being com-
munity property.62 The amendment to the California code adopt-
ed in 1891 providing that the husband cannot give away com-
munity property without the written consent of the wife, must
be construed as not applying to community property owned at
the time of its passage, otherwise it would be unconstitutional as
constituting a deprivation of property without due process. 63
It should be noticed that the above theory of the ownership
of community property was established at a time when by statute
the husband was given complete powers of management, control
and disposition inter vivos equal in all respects to similar powers
over his separate property. Whether the theory will continue to
be held as to community property acquired since the statutory
changes64 restricting his powers of alienation and giving the wife
equal power of devise is as yet unsettled.65
The theory of ownership outlined above has received recog-
nition at times in other states66 but unquestionably the view now
generally prevailing is that the wife has a vested interest equal
58Re Moffitt's Estate, (1908) 153 Cal. 359, 95 Pac. 653. See, too,
Moffitt v. Kelly, (1910) 218 U. S. 400, 54 L. Ed. 1086, 31 S. C. R. 79. This
has now been altered by a change in the inheritance tax act; Cal., Laws
1917, p. 881.59California, Civil Code, sec. 1401 (prior to amendment of 1923).
6Estate of Klumpke, (1914) 167 Cal. 415, 139 Pac. 1062.61People v. Swalm, (1889) 80 Cal. 46, 22 Pac. 67, 13 A. S. R. 96.
62-Bayless v. Read, (1920) 47 Cal. App. 139, 190 Pac. 211. Cf., too,
Badover v. Guaranty Bank, (1921) 186 Cal. 775, 200 Pac. 638.63Spreckels v. Spreckels, (1897) 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228; Scott
v. Austin, (1922) 58 Cal. App. 643, 207 Pac. 710. Compare also Roberts v.
Wehmeyer, (1923) 218 Pac. 22.64For the present state of legislation see supra, at notes 47, 49, 50.65Compare Roberts v. Wehmeyer, (Cal. 1923) 218 Pac. 22; Blum v.
Wardell, (1920) 270 Fed. 309.66Hall v. Johns, (1909) 17 Ida. 224, 105 Pac. 71; Succession of Boyer,
(1884) 36 La. Ann. 506; Jacob v. Falgoust, (1922) 150 La. 21, 90 So.
426; Reade v. De Lea, (1908) 14 N. M. 442, 95 Pac. 131.
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in legal dignity to that of the husband. 7 In the opinion of courts
adopting this latter view the greater power of management and
control vested in the husband is not to be attributed to any ex-
clusive ownership by him but rather to his position as "statutory
agent" of the community. While at least six of the eight com-
munity property states thus recognize an equality of ownership
between husband and wife, they are not altogether agreed upon
the exact legal form which such ownership is to take. In an
early Washington case,68 the court speaks on this subject as
follows:
"This creature is sometimes, though inaccurately, denominated
a species of partnership. It probably approaches more nearly to
that kind of partnership called universal than to any other busi-
ness relationship known to the civil or common law.
"A conventional community, in a state where statutes would
permit, might be contrived which would be substantially a part-
nership; but an ordinary legal community is, in many important
particulars, Ztuite distinct. It is like a partnership, in that some
property coming from or through one or other or both of the
individuals forms for both a common stock, which bears the
losses and receives, the profits of its management, and which is
liable for individual debts; but it is unlike, in that there is no
regard paid to proportionate contribution, service, or business
fidelity; that each individual, once in it, is incapable of disposing
of his or her interest, and that both are powerless to escape from
the relationship, to vary its terms, or to distribute its assets or
its profits. In fixity of constitution, a community resembles a
corporation. It is similar to a corporation in this, also, that the
state originates it, and that its powers and liabilities are ordained
by statute. In it, the proprietary interests of husband and wife
are equal, and those interests do not seem to be united merely,
but unified; not mixed or blent, but identified. It is sui generis
-a creature of the statute."
And in a later Washington case 69 the theory of ownership ac-
cepted in that state is thus expressed:
6 7La Tourette v. La Tourette, (1914) 15 Ariz. 200, 137 Pac. 426;
Kohny v. Dunbar, (1912) 21 Ida. 285, 121 Pac. 544; Peterson v. Peterson,(1922) 35 Ida. 470, 207 Pac. 425; In re Williams, (1916) 40 Nev. 241,
161 Pac. 741; Arnett v. Reade, (1910) 220 U. S. 311, 55 L. Ed. 477, 31
S. C. R. 425 (reversing the decision of the supreme court of the territory
of New Mexico in Reade v. De Lea, (1908) 14 N. M. 442, 95 Pac. 131) ;
Beals v. Ares, (1919) 25 N. M. 459, 185 Pac. 780; Edwards v. Brown,(1887) 68 Tex. 329, 4 S. W. 380, 5 S. W. 87 (and see also cases cited post
note 73) ; Holyoke v. Jackson, (1882) 3 Wash. Terr- 235, 3 Pac. 841;
Warburton v. White, (1899) 176 U. S. 484, 44 L. Ed. 555, 20 S. C. R. 404;
Ostheller v. Spokane and Inland Empire Ry. Co., (1919) 107 Wash. 678,
182 Pac. 630.68Holyoke v. Jackson, (1882) 3 Wash. Terr. 235, 3 Pac. 841.
69Ostheller v. Spokane, etc., R. Co., (1919) 107 Wash. 678, 182 Pac. 630.
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"The community of husband and wife is, under our laws, a
legal entity in which the individuality of both spouses is merged,
in so far as ownership of property acquired by either after
marriage is concerned, subject to certain exceptions of no moment
in our present inquiry; and title to property so acquired vests in
such legal entity."
On the other hand it is looked upon in other states as a form
of co-ownership. Frequently it has been likened to a partner-
ship but invariably important points of difference have been
noted as in the quotation above from Jackson v. Hlyoke. In
Arizona7 0 it has been said:
"From its nature and origin this particular estate arising dur-
ing the existence of the marriage relation may not be defined
with such precision as will comprehend all its phases, but in its
devolution and descent this species of ownership bears a striking
resemblance to hvo kinds of estates, that of an estate or tenancy
by the entirety and a tenancy in common."
' 71
The truth seems to be that as a form of co-ownership it is sui
generis and nothing is to be gained by attempting to assimilate
it to any form of common law co-ownership. In a majority of
the community property states this theory of co-ownership seems
to prevail. In most states it seems to be assumed that the in-
terests of both husband and wife are legal in character, and this
is true though the deed or other instrument by which the prop-
erty is acquired runs in the name of one spouse only.72 In Texas,
however, if the instrument of acquisition runs in the name of
one spouse only, his or her interest is legal while the interest of
the unnamed spouse is equitable and subject, therefore, to be
cut ' off by a conveyance of the legal title to a bona fide purchaser.73
III
Having thus briefly sketched the outlines of the two schemes
of marital ownership, we may now briefly note some comparisons
between them.
70La Tourette v. La Tourette, (1914) 15 Ariz. 200, 137 Pac. 426.71The likeness to tenancy by entirety, the court points out, arises from
the fact that in Arizona in case one spouse dies leaving no children, the
surviving spouse takes the whole. But if the decedent leaves children the
surviving spouse retains only his or her half and the children take the
decedent's half, thus resembling a tenancy in common.72Ewald v. Hufton, (1918) 31 Ida. 373, 173 Pac. 247. So, too, in
California the legal title to community property is none the less in the
husband because the conveyance of it runs only in the name of the wife.
Mitchell v. Moses, (1911) 16 Cal. App. 594, 117 Pac. 685; Peiser v. Griffin,
(1899) 125 Cal. 9, 57 Pac. 690.
73Edwards v. Brown, (1887) 68 Tex. 329, 4 S. W. 380, 5 S. W. 87;
Mitchell v. Schofield, (1915) 106 Tex. 512, 171 S. W. 1121; Burnham v.
Hardy Oil Co., (1917) 108 Tex. 555, 195 S. W. 1139.
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First as to property which under the community system is
recognized as separate. Speaking generally, such property, if
owned by the wife, is also recognized as her separate property
under the modified common law system. Her powers of manage-
ment, control, disposition inter vivos and at death do not differ
substantially in the two systems with respect to such property.
The same may be said of the husband. There seems, therefore,
to be no substantial difference between the two systems in the
degree of equality of husband and wife with regard to such
property.
Let us turn, then, to property which under the community
system is community in character. It is obvious that all such
property will be the separate property of either the husband or
"the wife under the modified common law system. Since it is
the alleged unequal and inferior position of the wife which usual-
ly creates concern it may be sufficient to consider whether under
the community system her position is any better than under the
modified common law.
Probably the most important single source of such property
is earnings. Under the modified common law system these are
the separate property of the spouse through whose efforts, they
are acquired. Indeed, as pointed out heretofore, this is one of
the chief grounds of complaint against such system. In many
cases the earnings of the spouse constitute a large part, if not
all of their assets. It is still true that the husband is usually
more active in business and in the direct accumulation of wealth
than is the -wife, though few will deny that she contributes in an
equally important manner to the welfare of the family by the
performance of her duties in the home. In view of the fact that
the husband receives full and direct benefit from the rendition
of such service by the wife, and in view of the further fact that
by rendering such service she ordinarily foregoes the opportunity
to accumulate property by her own efforts, it is argued that she
should share equally with the husband in the product of his toil.
Under the common law system of marital interests it is difficult,
if not impossible, to provide for such equality. What, then, is
the situation with reference to this problem under the com-
munity system ?
In the first place it is frequently provided that the earnings
of the wife and minor children living with her while she is living
apart from her husband shall be her separate property. 4 In other
74Arizona, Civil Code, sec. 3849; California, Civil Code, sec. 169; Idaho,
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states she and not the husband is given the power of manage-
ment and control over her own earnings even though such be
community property.75 Apparently the husband's earnings are
always community and nowhere is the wife given any powers of
control over them,. Her legal interest therein is an interest
wholly separated from all management and control subject only
to certain veto powers, such, for example, as the occasional re-
quirement that he can make no gift without her consent.76  The
husband during his lifetime can deal with his earnings in much
the same fashion as he deals with his separate property. Again
in many states the wife's earnings, in so far as they are a part
of the community property are thereby removed from her own
control and made subject to that of the husband.
A similar comparison may be made in regard to other prop-
erty interests arising through the agency of the wife. Thus rights
of action growing out of personal injuries sustained by her and
the damages, when recovered, are commonly community prop-
erty.77 As such they are under the control of the husband and
it has been held that, if the cause of action is based on the
negligence of the defendant, and the negligence of the husband
contributed, recovery is barred.78  But under the modified com-
mon law system such choses in action in so far at least as they
relate to her suffering, pain, loss of earning power, etc., are the
separate property of the wife. Not only may she sue thereon
in her own name7 ' but her right to recover will not be affected
by the contributing negligence of the husband. 0
Compiled Statutes 1919, sec. 4663; New Mexico, Statutes 1915, sec. 2760;
Nevada, Statutes 1912, sec. 2168.
75Idaho, Compiled Statutes 1919, secs. 4666, 4667; Nevada, Revised
Laws 1919, sec. 2160 (when such are used for the care and maintenance
of the family) ; Texas, Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes 1914, sec. 4622.
76California, Civil Code, sec. 172; Louisiana, Revised Civil Code,
sec. 2404.77Moody v. Southern Pacific Co., (1914) 167 Cal. 786, 141 Pac. 388;
Labonte v. Davidson, (1918) 31 Ida. 644, 175 Pac. 588; Harkness v.
Louisiana & N. W. Ry. Co., (1903) 110 La. 822, 34 So. 791 (subsequently
changed by statute, making damages for the wife's personal injuries her
separate property) ; Ezell v. Dodson, (1883) 60 Tex. 331; Hynes v. Colman
Dock Co., (1919) 108 Wash. 642, 185 Pac. 617.
7sBasler v. Sacramento Gas & Electric Co., (1910) 158 Cal. 514,
111 Pac. 530; Ostheller v. Spokane R. R. Co., (1919) 107 Wash. 678,
182 Pac. 630.
79Little Rock Gas & Fuel Co. v. Coppedge, (1915) 116 Ark. 334, 172
S. W. 885; Anderson v. Friend, (1874) 71 Ill. 475; City of Portland v.
Taylor, (1890) 125 Ind. 522, 25 N. E. 459; McGovern v. Inter Urban Ry.
Co., (1907) 136 Ia. 13, 111 N. W. 412; South Covington Ry. v. Bolt,(1900) 59 S. W. 26, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 906; Boyle v. Saginaw, (1900) 124
Mich. 348, 82 N. W. 1057; Libaire v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co.,(1911) 113 Minn. 517, 130 N. W. 8; Chadron v. Glover, (1895) 43 Neb.
732, 62" N. W. 62; Fife v. Oshkosh, (1895) 89 Wis. 540, 62 N. W. 541.
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The same is true of "accumulations" of the wife. Such term
seems to cover property interests acquired by a variety of means,
for example, acquisition by adverse possession.81 Such property
commonly belongs to the community and again the wife's power
of management, control and disposition is thereby rendered more
restricted than in a modified common law jurisdiction where it
would be her separate property.
What of the wife's position in case of death? If the husband
dies first she will receive at least one half of the community prop-
erty, including, therefore, a share in the husband's earnings.8 2 But
under the modified common law she is frequently as well pro-
vided for by statutes of succession giving her an interest which
cannot be defeated by any will of the husband and such interest
affects property which in a community state would be separate as
well as that which would belong to the community. 83
In case the wife dies first, she does have a testamentary ad-
vantage in a community state. She may be desirous of provid-
ing for the support of her children or her parents or other
persons. Under the common law system there is no way in
which she may do this out of property acquired by the husband's
efforts. But in most of the community states she is given power
to devise her half of the community property without reference
to the source of its acquisition and usually without restriction
as to the persons named as devisees.84
The foregoing discussion would seem to show that the greater
equality between husband and wife under the community system
is largely theoretical, at least during, the joint lives of the two,
and that, while the wife does have enlarged powers of devise
over property acquired by the efforts of her husband during marri-
age, on the other hand she has less extended powers of manage-
ment, control and disposition over the property acquired by her
own efforts during marriage than has her sister who lives under
the modified common law regime. It does not seem at all clear
that the latter would secure any net gain by a substitution of the
community for the modified common law system of marital own-
ership.
8OLouisville Ry. Co. v. McCarthy, (1908) 129 Ky. 814, 112 S. W. 925;
Moon v. St. Louis Transit Co., (1911) 237 Mo. 425, 141 S. W. 870; Bailey
v. Centerville, (1901) 115 Ia. 271, 88 N. W. 739; Lammers v. Great North-
ern Ry. Co., (1901) 82 Minn. 120, 84 N. W. 728.
8'Union Oil Co. v. Stewart, (1910) 158 Cal. 149, 110 Pac. 313.
82See supra at notes 50, 51 and 52.
83Compare supra at notes 25 and 26.84Compare supra at note 50.
